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Abstract 
 
Metonymy, like metaphor, has received much attention in cognitive linguistics literature (Croft, 
1993; Kövecses & Radden, 1998; Panther & Radden, 1999). Most experimental work focuses on 
comprehension. However, why a speaker would choose to produce a metonym in some cases and 
not others is not fully understood. Connectionist models are well-suited to deal with the partial-
semantic/partial-syntactic information which is characteristic of metonymy. Moreover, these 
models can capture some of the complex, time-varying dynamics of language development. 
Here, a model is presented in which dyads of artificial agents (each a recurrent neural network 
based on Rogers, et al., 2004) were trained in a structured environment to develop a language 
and use it to coordinate in a simple task. The model was informed by an experiment with human 
subjects based on existing work (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Selten & Warglien, 2007). While 
inconclusive, the study offers some insight into the strengths and weaknesses of this particular 
approach to modeling metonymy production. 
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A Multi-Agent, Connectionist Model of Metonymy Production 
 
 Metonymy has received plenty of attention in the field of cognitive linguistics (CL). 
Though originally overshadowed by the study of metaphor, by the late 1990s a growing 
consensus began to emerge that metonymy may actually be the more fundamental cognitive 
phenomenon (Kövecses & Radden, 1998; Panther & Radden, 1999). Despite this theoretical 
claim, there has been little psycholinguistics research on metonymy (Gibbs, 2007). This is partly 
because designing a task to reliably elicit or control for metonymy in natural language would be 
difficult, and also because there is a lack of models from which testable predictions might be 
made. 
Metonymy can be notoriously hard to define in the first place, and this adds to its 
slipperiness (Barcelona, 2011). The most widely accepted view, and the one taken here, is stated 
in Panther & Radden (1999): “metonymy is a cognitive process where one conceptual entity, the 
vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same idealized 
cognitive model.” 
This definition can be illustrated with an example. Consider the statement, “Proust is 
tough to read” (Croft, 1993). A listener will likely have little trouble understanding that “Proust” 
refers not to Marcel Proust the person, but to something closely related to and salient about 
Proust—namely, his books. Thus, the vehicle in this case would be the concept of Proust, the 
author. The target, to which the vehicle provides mental access, is the set of books written by 
Proust. 
Note that the vehicle provides mental access by virtue of how closely related the vehicle 
and target concepts are. Conceptual contiguity is a classic feature of metonymy. To describe this, 
many CL theorists appeal to domains. In the context of domains, metonymy can be seen as a 
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process of domain highlighting (Croft, 1993). Barcelona states this more formally: “Domain 
highlighting consists in highlighting a secondary domain within the domain matrix constituted by 
a speaker’s encyclopedic knowledge of the meaning of a linguistic expression” (2011). Other 
authors sometimes use different terms other than “domain” (i.e. cognitive models), but the 
semantics of these distinctions do not concern the present study. To avoid equivocation, 
“domain” will be understood here to be closely related to the treatment in Chen (2011). 
An additional complication that falls out of this definition of metonymy is that several 
different types are possible, depending on the relationship between different subdomains. Some 
examples are PRODUCT-FOR-PRODUCER (e.g. “He’s got a Picasso”), OBJECT-FOR-USER 
(e.g. “The sax has the flu today”), and PLACE-FOR-EVENT (e.g. “Watergate changed out 
politics”) (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Arguably one of the simplest types is PART-FOR-
WHOLE, sometimes referred to as synecdoche. As this label implies, the vehicle in a PART-
FOR-WHOLE is simply part of the target concept (e.g. using “wheels” to refer to a car). 
 Most experimental studies have focused on metonymy comprehension rather than 
production. One notable example, a study by Frisson and Pickering (1999), examined metonymy 
processing difficulty by tracking subjects’ eye movements. There have been some studies 
investigating production indirectly by examination of corpora (Handl, 2011), but to date there are 
no studies of which the author is aware in which metonymy can be reliably elicited in a 
controlled, laboratory setting. Such studies would be useful in addressing a simple question: why 
produce metonymic utterances at all? We currently have a stockpile of theories from CL (cf. 
Handl, 2011), but no methods to test them directly.  
The present study represents an attempt at a “first-pass” model in the connectionist 
paradigm and a corresponding experimental task to fill the previously mentioned gap. 
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Chronologically, the experiment was designed and performed first so that some of the difficulties 
inherent in eliciting production from humans might be better understood. The design was based 
on some well-established work in psycholinguistics research relating to pragmatics and language 
emergence (Clarke & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Selten & Warglien, 2007). These are discussed in 
more detail in the following sections. 
Common Ground 
 A proper model of metonymy production should be able to replicate the conditions that 
license emergence of metonymic expressions in natural language. But speakers do not produce 
language in a vacuum; humans learn language from one another and share ideas through both 
linguistic and non-linguistic communication. Indeed, even differentiating production and 
comprehension is problematic, since a language user will often need to switch rapidly back and 
forth between these, perhaps even needing to be in both roles simultaneously. Importantly, it also 
seems that metonymy has a functional, referring role which requires some task or context (one in 
which the best referent needs to be decided upon). The most natural scenario for this is in 
ordinary conversation. The first desideratum for our model is that it captures this intuition. 
 Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs (1986) worked on a simple experimental paradigm to study 
precisely this kind of problem. They were interested in how language users collaborate to find 
common ground—an agreed upon set of meanings for linguistic expressions—while solving a 
task. This is relevant here for the following reason: if metonymy is produced because of the 
relationship of concepts in a particular conceptual domain, then interlocutors in both production 
and comprehension roles should have similar cognitive representations of that domain—or at 
least they should understand the organization of each other’s domain. This is crucial, because we 
can imagine that if their domains structures were wildly different, then a metonym would 
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probably not be interpreted correctly. So finding common ground can be understood for our 
purpose as the process of shaping domain representations so that they align well enough for 
metonymy to work. 
The Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs study used two participants who were seated so that they 
could not see one another, but they could hear each other. Both were given a set of 12 images of 
ambiguous figures, composed of tangrams. One subject was designated as the director and the 
other was the matcher. On each trial, the director had the images placed in a certain order, while 
the matcher’s images were shuffled. It was the director’s task to describe the images so that the 
matcher could place them in the correct order. The experiment ended after six trials. 
 They recorded large quantities of data, as subjects were allowed to freely describe the 
items. One of the key findings was that subjects tended to reduce the complexity of their 
descriptions as the experiment progressed. This is because the images never changed, so the 
subjects were simply negotiating the best descriptions. Over time, superfluous lexical items (like 
provisional phrases) and descriptors that were not agreed upon were dropped. 
 One minor observation was something Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs called narrowing. They 
defined narrowing as a “refinement in perspective” in which “the focus of a perspective was 
narrowed to just one part of a figure” (1986). For example, “the guy in the sleeping bag” could 
be reduced at a later time to just “sleeping bag.” Note that “sleeping bag” is peripheral in the 
original description, but it later comes to represent the whole configuration. Because narrowing 
resembles metonymy in this way (particularly PART-WHOLE-METONYMY), this paradigm 
seems like it may be a good starting point for a task designed to elicit metonymy. 
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Language Emergence 
In order to understand the fundamental question of how metonymy emerges, it may be 
necessary to abstract away from the complexities of an already fully developed language, and to 
recreate conditions in which a language is dynamically shaped by its users in the course of 
language development. 
Prior work in experimental semiotics (ES) could be helpful in this regard. Galantucci 
(2005) and Selten & Warglien (2007) are two notable examples. Like the tangram studies, these 
were in the context of cooperative tasks. In Galantucci’s study, participants created and 
communicated with novel orthographic symbols. In Selten & Warglien (2007), participants 
communicated with a predetermined set of symbols. In both cases, the participants had to 
develop meanings for symbols on their own, effectively creating their own language. 
 The biggest downside of the original tangram approach for our present purposes is that 
most cases of metonymy in natural language seem to be conventionalized (Handl, 2011). They 
are already fixed, and we may not learn much about how they became lexicalized in the first 
place. Stripping away natural language semantics by incorporating some of the ES methodology 
would allow the lexicalization process to be more directly observed. In this case, selection of a 
language medium becomes an important concern. Also, some complications may be introduced 
in the analysis, since interpreting meaning in an artificial language, especially one with allowed 
ambiguity, is not a trivial task. 
Connectionist Networks 
 Parallel Distributed Processing, or PDP (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986a) laid the 
foundation for a class of models known as connectionist models. Not all connectionist models 
are the same, but many are based on the premise that representations, rather than being atomic in 
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nature, may be distributed over an entire network of units. The activation state of a connectionist 
network is the vector of its unit activations. Connectionist models, using assemblies of simple 
processing units, are often referred to as artificial neural networks, or simply neural networks. 
 These neural networks have some interesting properties. They are designed to have an 
element of biological plausibility, and they are relatively robust against damage. By adding 
recurrence, these networks can often take on additional properties that make them suitable to 
simulating language tasks, including tasks involving semantics. Specifically, recurrent models 
with the right processing dynamics can form attractors (see Hinton & Shallice, 1991; Plaut & 
Shallice, 1993; Harm & Seidenberg, 1999, 2004). In dynamical systems, attractors are points in a 
space towards which solutions move over time. In recurrent neural networks, repeated training 
can cause attractors to develop in the activation state space. This property was used, for instance, 
by Plaut & Shallice (1993) to create semantic attractors, corresponding to semantic 
representations (concepts) in studies on deep dyslexia. 
 The importance of attractor dynamics to the present study is that they may present a 
natural implementation of conceptual contiguity in domains, which is essential to metonymy (for 
a sense of this similarity, compare the diagrams of domains in Chen, 2011 to the diagrams of 
semantic attractors in Plaut & Shallice, 1993). If two attractors are close to one another in the 
semantic space, and the state of the system approaches this configuration, then noise may push 
the state into one of two possible end behaviors. 
The very notion of distributed representations could also be useful in understanding the 
cognitive processing behind metonymy. It is easy to imagine, in the case of PART-FOR-
WHOLE metonymy, that a subset of the features of an intended “whole” becomes activated, and 
the “part” corresponding to this subset gets named instead. Thus, the combination of distributed 
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representations and attractor dynamics makes the connectionist approach an attractive one for the 
metonymy production problem. 
Operational Definition and Objectives 
The CL definition of metonymy for natural language is inherently complicated. For all 
analyses in this paper, a clear, consistent definition of metonymy was needed that would be 
reasonable for a simple, artificial language. The Clarke & Wilkes-Gibbs (1986) definition of 
narrowing was taken to be the basis for the present operational definition of metonymy. To 
observe such narrowing would be a good indication that a simple form of PART-FOR-WHOLE 
metonymy was being used (because of the simplicity and compositional structure of PART-
FOR-WHOLE metonymy, we will restrict our attention to only this type for the remainder of this 
paper). An operational definition of metonymy can therefore be stated as follows. 
 
Definition 1. A word,  , is used metonymically if and only if it meets the following three 
criteria: 
i) Word   is used in conjunction with one or more other words at some time,  , to 
describe object  . 
ii) Word   is used by itself to describe   at some time,   ,     . 
iii) There exists a consistent, one-to-one mapping from   to some feature of  . 
 
 
Note that this definition does not require metonymy to persist. In natural languages, it is 
surely the case that not all instances of linguistic innovation become lexicalized. What is of 
interest here is the emergence of metonymy as a function of language change. While this 
definition would certainly allow a metonym to become lexicalized, it would also allow 
metonymy to be used as a transient linguistic tool, created to fill a specific need at a particular 
point in time. 
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This definition ignores syntax, as the order (if it exists) of symbols is not taken into 
account. This is likely unrealistic in the case of natural language, especially if syntactic form and 
content are linked as in construction grammars (Fillmore, Kay, & O’Connor, 1988). However, 
the absence of syntax in this model is motivated by the primary concern of this study; we are 
interested here in the simplest conditions that may lead to the emergence of metonymy. If 
metonymy could occur without syntactic constraints, then this would indeed be the simplest case, 
and different syntactic constructions may then serve to augment the use of metonymy. Since this 
is the first study, to our knowledge, designed to address these questions in this way, the simplest 
case is preferred. An improvement in future studies would be to allow the role of syntax to be 
explored. Connectionist models could still apply, as there are recurrent neural network 
architectures which have been shown to be capable of learning syntactic structure (Elman, 1990). 
For the present study, the main research question was this: what are the conditions that 
license the emergence of metonymy in a language as it changes over time? The objective was to 
construct a model utilizing connectionist principles that would be capable of simulating the 
production of metonymy as two agents learn and simultaneously shape the semantics of a shared 
language. The behavior of the model was evaluated by testing a specific hypothesis and 
comparing the results to human data. The null hypothesis was that the presence of contrastive 
features in the language users’ environment has no influence on the frequency of metonymical 
expressions—in other words, that contrastiveness does not constrain which lexical items are 
likely to function as metonyms. The alternative hypothesis is that contrastive features in the 
environment are more likely to be described metonymically in the language than non-contrastive 
ones. 
METONYMY PRODUCTION MODEL  11 
 
This paper is organized in two main sections. Experiment I describes the preliminary, 
exploratory study with human subjects. Results from Experiment I were used not only to provide 
a baseline for statistical hypothesis testing, but also to inform the implementation of the model. 
Both the model and some analyses of its output are described under Experiment II. Finally, 
general discussion summarizes the results of both experiments. 
Experiment I 
Method 
Participants. Sixty-six undergraduate students enrolled in psychology courses at the 
University of Connecticut participated in the experiment for course credit. 
Materials and Design. Materials consisted of a two-dimensional, virtual environment 
and an alphabet of symbols. The environment was populated with objects, each object being 
composed of three features: shape, color, and pattern. Each feature could take on one of three 
values: shapes were either square, circle, or triangle; colors were red, blue, or yellow; and 
patterns were vertical lines, crosses, or curved lines. These nine features could be combined into 
a total of twenty-seven possible objects. See Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Three of the possible 27 objects used in Experiment I. 
 
The task required participants to develop a language. Following previous work in ES 
(Galantucci, 2005; Selten & Warglien, 2007), we restricted the language to only an orthographic 
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component. As in Selten & Warglien (2007), a simple alphabet was fixed before the present 
study began. This alphabet was designed around three base symbols, Ж, Ҕ, and Ԃ, from the 
Cyrillic alphabet. These three characters were selected by the experimenter with the assumption 
that they were both unfamiliar to native English speakers, and also relatively dissimilar to one 
another. These base symbols were also given variants that were systematically related across the 
base forms. The first variant of each symbol was the same as the base form, but with an added 
diacritic line over the top of the symbol. The second variant was a 90° counter-clockwise rotation 
of the base form, with no other changes. These variants were created to introduce systematicity 
to the primitives of the language, thus potentially offsetting the predicted difficult of the task. 
These base symbols along with their variants are demonstrated in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. The alphabet used in Experiment I. The first column contains the base symbols. Columns two and three display 
variants. In composing a message, only one symbol from each row was allowed. 
 
The experiment was organized in blocks. There were twelve blocks, each composed of 
six individual trials, for a total of seventy-two trials. A trial consisted of three objects being 
displayed in a two-dimensional plane on a computer screen. One of these objects was designated 
as the target, and the others competitors. For later analysis, three conditions (all-contrastive, 
single-contrastive, and unconstrained) were established based on the number of contrastive 
features between target and competitor objects. In the all-contrastive condition, no features were 
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shared between any of the objects on screen, so that each feature dimension was contrastive. In 
single-contrastive, exactly two features were shared between the target and at least one of the 
competitors, and one feature was unshared. In the unconstrained condition, the number of shared 
features was equally likely to be zero, one, or two (not three, because duplicate objects were not 
allowed). 
Randomization was involved in selecting which particular objects were displayed from 
trial to trial. A computer program, using a pseudo-random process, generated 81 potential trial 
combinations for each condition, making sure that any feature-sharing constraints were satisfied. 
Additionally, there was some counterbalancing: of the 81 potential trials in each condition, every 
possible object was a target exactly three times so that no single object would be over-
represented in the trial sample space. 
Finally, a virtual interface was built into the experiment program which allowed alphabet 
symbols to be manipulated and combined into strings. The interface was set up so that 
participants could use the computer mouse to drag symbols into a blank composition area. 
Symbols could be added to a message by clicking the desired symbol and dragging it into the 
composition area. Removing a symbol could be accomplished by dragging it outside of the 
composition area. Certain restrictions were imposed by the design of the interface; no symbol 
could be used more than once in a message, and the ordering of symbols was fixed and outside 
of the participants’ control. Clicking on the symbol without dragging allowed one to cycle 
through its various forms. The interface can be seen in Figure 3. 
 Procedure. The experiment was run on multiple computers simultaneously in a single 
room. This setup allowed multiple subjects to be involved in each session. Each participant was 
seated at a computer running the experiment program, which was designed so that two programs 
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could transmit information via internet connection. Unbeknownst to participants, experimenters 
randomly paired them together before the experiment began, and took care to situate each 
member of a dyad so that one could not see the other’s screen. Each dyad was also assigned to 
one of the three conditions at the beginning of the experiment. 
 
 
Figure 3. The message composition interface in Experiment I. The image on the left is the producer’s screen, and the 
image on the right belongs to the responder. The target object was highlighted for the producer (framed by a green box), 
and the producer used the message composition interface at the bottom of the screen. After clicking the green “send” 
button, the responder was able to see the same set of objects along with the message sent by the producer. The responder 
would click an object to end the trial. Feedback, given to both subjects, is not shown here. 
 
 Participants were given both written and verbal instructions before the experiment began. 
They were told that they would be cooperating with an anonymous partner, and that they would 
be composing and sending messages back and forth to each other with the task of describing 
objects on their screens. Additionally, an initial practice session was included to familiarize 
participants with the message composition interface. 
 After completing the practice session, the first block was initiated. At the beginning of 
each block, participants were assigned to a role: either producer, or responder (corresponding to 
director and matcher respectively in Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). The producer was tasked 
with composing and sending messages, and the responder would receive the producer’s 
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messages. Also, at the beginning of each block, participants had the opportunity to review the 
instructions relevant to their upcoming role. 
 Each trial began as follows. The responder’s screen displayed only the message, “waiting 
for partner.” The producer’s screen was populated by the target and competitor objects with 
relative object positions randomized. The particular set of objects displayed was determined by 
drawing at random from the distribution of potential sets for the dyad’s condition. For example, 
if the dyad was assigned to the all-contrastive condition, then any object was equally likely to be 
the target, and no features would be shared between any of the objects on screen.  
The target object was indicated for the producer by the presence of a green rectangular 
border. The producer was instructed to compose a message, using the interface at the bottom of 
the screen, so that the responder would be able to identify the target correctly. After composing a 
message (no time limit was imposed), the producer could click a “send” button, and no further 
revision to the message was allowed. Next, the responder was shown the same objects—with 
relative positions also randomized—except that the target object was not indicated. Instead of 
seeing an interface, the responder was shown the producer’s message, and was instructed to click 
on the object which the message described. After the responder clicked an object, both 
participants were given feedback as to whether or not the responder chose correctly. 
 At the start of every new block, participants switched roles. This was continued until all 
twelve blocks had been completed. The duration of the experiment varied, but no group took 
longer than the allotted forty-five minutes to complete the experiment. 
Results 
 By Definition 1 (parts i & ii), a necessary condition for metonymy was a reduction in 
message length, in which a single symbol used to describe an object had at some previous time 
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been used as part of a longer description of the same object. Communication, in such 
circumstances, would presumably be most effective if only a single symbol were required to 
differentiate a target object from its competitors. It was found that, of the 2376 total trials across 
all dyads, 139 trials required at least two symbols to correctly identify the target object. These 
trials were discarded prior to analysis. 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
Figure 4. Accuracy averaged by condition. (a) Human subjects. (b) Neural network model. 
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 Figure 4(a) displays average accuracy plotted over time for each of the three conditions. 
Here, accuracy refers to how well messages were successfully understood. If a responder always 
chose the correct objects based on the producer’s messages, then accuracy, as a proportion of 
correct trials, would be counted as 1. If a responder never chose correctly, accuracy would be 
counted as 0.  
Accuracy data needed to be considered, because we would probably not gain much 
insight about subtle language behaviors of subjects if they could not use their languages 
successfully. Note that each condition had a relatively small number of dyads (11 all-contrastive, 
10 single-contrastive, and 12 unconstrained). In order to determine whether or not one condition 
performed better overall, an ANCOVA analysis was performed on dyad accuracy over the 12 
blocks in each of the three conditions. It was found that all-contrastive performed significantly 
better than single-contrastive at a .05 significance level (estimated difference between intercepts 
0.0183, CI [0.0019, 0.0346]). There was no significant difference in the performance of 
unconstrained compared to either of the other conditions. Despite the better performance on 
average of the all-contrastive group, it should be noted that it was still rare for any dyad to have 
two perfect blocks in a row (only four dyads achieved this). Therefore, we can conclude that 
performance was not very high overall. 
 Now what about metonymy? It is not enough to say that a participant who produced a 
reduction by Definition 1 (parts i & ii) was actually using metonymy, because there is a lack of 
information about what individual symbols mean. A measure was needed to describe the stability 
of a subject’s mapping between symbols and features. We were looking, especially, for a one-to-
one mapping between a symbol and a particular feature (part iii of Definition 1). Here, a D-prime 
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analysis was used to determine, for each of the nine symbols, the consistency of mapping 
between that symbol and each of the nine possible features. This required 81 D-prime scores (  ) 
for each subject, where each    was estimated by calculating both the “hit” rate and “false alarm” 
rates for its symbol-feature pair (only trials in the second half of the experiment were considered 
so that early errors would be discounted), and then deriving the D-prime value itself by the 
formula     (   )   (           ).   values were taken from a standardized table. 
 The resulting   s were in the interval [-6.8, 6.8]. A high value meant that the 
corresponding symbol was mapped strongly to the corresponding feature; in this case, the signal 
(correspondence between the symbol and feature) would be high, and the noise (correspondence 
between the symbol and other features) would be low. But what value is high enough? We chose 
a threshold of 3.4, so any symbol-feature mapping with     3.4 was considered to be strong 
enough to be considered stable. 
 Here, a symbol that had a consistent one-to-one mapping to a particular feature is said to 
be compositional. A symbol that was both reduced (by Definition 1, i & ii) and compositional 
(by Definition 1, iii) would satisfy our operational definition metonymy (note: when testing a 
contrived, perfectly compositional language, it was found that   s for the metonymic symbol 
were found to be unaffected by reduction).  
By this measure, metonymy was only observed twice in the human data – too few to 
make any statistical claims. A more substantial picture emerged from the separate 
compositionality and reduction information extracted from each condition. Table 1 shows both 
the proportion of symbols per dyad that were reduced at least once, and the proportion of 
symbols that were found to be compositional by the D-prime analysis. 
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Table 1 
Proportion of Symbols, Compositional or Reduced 
  Condition 
  all-contrastive single-contrastive unconstrained 
Type Experiment Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Compositional Human 0.39 0.08 0.18 0.13 0.21 0.13 
Model 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.04 
Reduced Human 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.04 
Model 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.14 
Note. Standard deviation is estimated sample standard deviation. 
 
 
 Finally, a one-way ANOVA was used to test the alternate hypothesis—that manipulation 
of contrastive features would influence the frequency of metonyms (symbols that were both 
compositional and reduced). Since proportion of metonymic symbols was measured, an arcsine 
transformation was applied to the data. No significant effect was found, F(2, 30)   0.75, p   
.482. 
Discussion 
 The task was found to be very difficult for human subjects. This can be seen in the low 
overall accuracy. Also, the low proportion of compositionality indicates that the languages 
created by participants did not tend toward one-to-one mappings between symbols and individual 
features. For these reasons, interpretation of the ANOVA results is probably not useful. 
 Several measures might be taken to improve accuracy, thereby reducing noise in the 
results. For one, the number of features may have been too large for participants to keep up with. 
Reducing the number of dimensions (from three to two, for example) could certainly make the 
task easier. Also, the experiment had a fixed number of blocks. It is possible that, given more 
time, most of the groups would have achieved high accuracy. An accuracy-based stop criterion 
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might have allowed each group to create their language on a timescale that was optimal for them, 
although this would make analysis more difficult. 
 The experimenter’s choice of alphabet symbols was designed to push participants 
towards an optimal solution. There was an equivalence class of perfectly compositional 
solutions—each a one-to-one mapping of symbols to features—and the 3 3, base-variant 
alphabet structure, shown in Figure 2, was intended to make these solutions more obvious. Since 
no participants arrived at a perfectly compositional mapping, we can possibly infer that the 
alphabet structure was not helpful in driving participants towards the optimal solutions, even 
though some tendency for compositionality was observed. This may have something to do with 
the alphabet symbols themselves, since there was some tendency for participants to map 
structure of the orthographic symbols onto features in creative ways (e.g. using a more curvy 
symbol to describe “circle”, or a symbol that partly resembles the letter b for “blue”). 
 As this experiment was exploratory in nature, it is not surprising that the results lacked 
significance. It should be noted that narrowing was very infrequent in the original tangram 
studies, and so a low proportion of metonymic terms was expected here. Still, the nature of these 
preliminary results is clearly too uncertain for the few examples in these data to be truly 
considered metonymy. But it is a start. These data will be referenced in Experiment II, for 
comparison to the neural network model results. 
Experiment II 
Neural Network Model 
 Architecture. The present model was based on the PDP approach taken in Rogers, et al. 
(2004), but it was modified to simulate two artificial agents. This was accomplished by having 
two distinct, but isomorphic modules corresponding to the two agents (here, agent refers to a 
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simulation of a human subject). Information could be transferred between the two modules via a 
set of shared language units. See Figure 5 for a schematic of the model. 
 Each module, representing an agent, is really just a collection of groups (here, “group” is 
used instead of the more traditional term, “layer,” but it simply denotes a set of functionally 
related processing units). The groups within a module were designed to be as close as possible to 
the Rogers, et al. (2004) model. A central semantic group is connected to a visual group, a focus 
group, and three language groups. The focus group was included in the present study to replicate 
Experiment I, and was not part of Rogers’ original model. Also, the language groups are divided 
here in a way that differs from that study. Rather than have classes of units representing different 
types of verbal propositions, three language groups were created here to mirror the three possible 
symbol slots in the human experiment. 
 Each visual group had 27 units corresponding to individual features of three objects. As 
in Experiment I, an object could be composed of exactly three out of nine possible features. 
Units were ordered in each visual group, so that the first set of nine units corresponded to object 
one, the second set to object two, and the third set to object three. In each trial, visual groups for 
both agents were clamped with the same bit vector, where an individual feature was present if 
that unit’s value was 1 (“on”) and not present if the value was 0 (“off”). 
The function of the focus group would depend on the role (producer or responder) that its 
agent was in, since an agent could be either. When producing, the agent’s focus group, which 
had three units, was clamped with a bit vector input pattern for the duration of the trial. One unit 
would be clamped “on”, and the others “off”. The “on” clamp functioned in the same way as the 
rectangular green frame in Experiment I, only here it picked out a discrete-valued position (either 
one, two, or three) corresponding to one of the objects in the visual field. The responding agent’s 
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focus group was the site of training.  Its output was compared to a target at the end of a trial. The 
target was identical to whatever clamp was being applied to the producer in that same trial. In 
other words, the responder had to learn to select the abstract object to which the producer was 
attending. 
 
 
Figure 5. Network architecture. Each agent is represented by a module, as indicated by the dotted boundaries. The 
modules are linked by a set of three shared language groups, corresponding to the message slots from Experiment I. One 
unit in each language group is reserved for the empty string,  . Arrows to and from the language groups indicate that the 
top agent is producing a message, and the bottom agent is receiving it. Another set of arrows (not shown) with directions 
reversed would be used when roles were switched. 
 
 As already mentioned, the three language groups were designed set up to mirror the 
three-slot symbol structure of the message interface in Experiment I. Each language group 
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contained four units: one for each of the three possible symbol variants, and one to represent an 
empty string,  . The   unit was required in order for reductions to be possible. The units were 
ordered, and the first unit in each language group was a-priori considered the   unit. 
 Groups were connected by weights that were either bidirectional or unidirectional. Here, 
“connected” means fully connected, such that each unit in the source group is connected to every 
unit in the destination group. Weights from the visual to semantic groups were unidirectional, 
because visual inputs were always clamped, and they did not require feedback from the semantic 
units. Between focus and semantic groups, there were bidirectional weights. There were two 
separate sets of weights between the modules; these weights, connected to the intermediate 
language groups, were either directed from module one to module two or vice versa depending 
on which module was simulating the producer role from Experiment I. 
 Recurrence was built into the model by creating weights from each semantic group to 
itself through that group’s own set of cleanup units. Each semantic group was given 100 units, 
and each cleanup group had 20 units. 
 Dynamics. As in Rogers, et al. (2004), a fixed, untrainable bias of value  2.0 was 
applied to all groups in the model. This bias functioned to drive the unit activations downward in 
the absence of input. 
 The hyperbolic tangent function was used as the activation function for the semantic 
units, as it was found, in early tests, to speed convergence. A sigmoid function was not used for 
the language or focus groups because these groups were involved in making discrete choices. For 
instance, human participants in Experiment I were not allowed to make continuous adjustments 
to the symbols that constituted their messages, and so a continuous vector of outputs would not 
effectively simulate the choice of a particular symbol in one of the language groups.  
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To discretize the outputs of these groups, a special, two-part activation function was 
defined. First, this function used the softmax rule to compute the activations of the group’s units 
so they all would add to one, effectively generating a probability distribution over symbol values 
(McCullagh & Nelder, 1989). In the next step, a simple greedy algorithm was used to select the 
unit with the highest activation, and this unit’s activation was pushed up to a value of 1.0, while 
all other units were set to  . 
 Training. The back-propagation through time (BPTT) algorithm with cross-entropy error 
was used here (Rumelhart, Hinton, & Williams, 1986b; same algorithm as Harm & Seidenberg, 
1999). Each trial had a duration of 10 discrete time steps. The training procedure was online, and 
activations were reset to a default value at the beginning of each trial. Momentum was set to 0. 
 During initial tests, it was found that the discretized activation of the focus and language 
groups made learning convergence very hard for the model. A preconditioning phase was 
designed in which these groups used the continuous version of the softmax activation function 
for some fixed duration (5000 trials of precondition at a learning rate of 0.01 was found to be 
adequate). This preconditioning took up only a relatively small fraction of the total trials, and it 
facilitated convergence later on. This is not completely unreasonable, as it may actually be a way 
to account for non-linguistic biases that human subjects bring to the task, even without natural 
language semantics—preferences for certain colors or shapes, etc. After preconditioning, the 
learning rate was lowered to 0.001. 
 Visual input patterns were generated that matched the distribution of objects in 
Experiment I. Focus group input patterns were generated that corresponded to the original target 
objects in Experiment I.  
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In each trial, the input patterns were clamped for all 10 time steps. Note that, in 
Experiment I, responders did not get access to any visual information about objects or their 
partners’ messages until after a message was sent. To replicate this, the semantic units of the 
responder were clamped to a value of  , and the focus units clamped to a value of      for the 
first five time steps. This had the effect of “blinding” the responder while the initial processing 
dynamics of the producer were taking shape. The target pattern was not compared to the 
responder’s focus group activations until the final three time steps. 
Simulation: Revisiting Experiment I 
 Method. The model was run in a similar fashion to the procedure of Experiment I. Ten 
simulations were run in each of the three conditions. For each simulation, a different random 
seed was used to simulate the effect of individual differences among subjects. After every six 
iterations, the roles of the two agents were reversed. Training continued until 36,000 trials had 
been completed. A fixed window was chosen to simulate the fixed duration of Experiment I. 
 Results. The same analyses from Experiment I were repeated here. Figure 4(b) shows 
accuracy by condition over the course of each simulation. Table 1 shows compositionality and 
reduction data. 
 Metonymic behavior was very rare in the model, as it was in the human data. There was 
only a single instance of a symbol which was both compositional and reduced. As expected, the 
one-way ANOVA demonstrated no effect of feature contrastiveness on metonymic frequency, 
F(2, 27)   1, p   .381. 
 Discussion. The high accuracy of the all-contrastive condition is worth noting. Within 
less than 15,000 trials, these networks converged to a solution with 100% accuracy. What may 
be misleading is the low accuracy of the unconstrained condition. This is misleading because it 
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may be tempting to infer that the networks could not learn a good solution. However, the upward 
trend in accuracy is an indication that the network may have performed optimally if given 
enough time (much like the human subjects). 
 One variable that was not manipulated here was the number of hidden units. The number 
of hidden units (100) was used simply because initial tests found it was adequate to lead to 
convergence. However, varying the hidden units would certainly lead to different performance, 
and it would need to be explored further.  
General Discussion 
These results may hold some clues regarding how the problem might be explored in 
future experiments and model implementations. One interesting thing to note is that the all-
contrastive condition seems to have the highest average accuracy for both humans and networks. 
This is perhaps not surprising, as a clean mapping from symbols to features might be easier in 
this condition. Unfortunately, conclusions about the accuracy data in the human experiment are 
not reliable given the noisy nature of the human dyad performance in the face of a difficult task. 
But it is clear in the case of the networks that consistently contrastive features made the task 
quite easy. Unpredictably contrastive features made the task extremely difficult at first, with 
accuracy below chance. Even in this case, the model can still converge slowly. 
The most striking result is that compositionality and reduction profiles of the humans and 
networks are almost polar opposites of each other. Humans tended to develop at least some 
compositional structure to their languages, but with very little narrowing. Networks, on the other 
hand, often utilized message length reduction; but we cannot classify this behavior as 
metonymic, because the symbol-feature mappings did not turn out to be one-to-one. Indeed, the 
net    gain for networks was negative, indicating that they tended not to settle into a 
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compositional system (for humans the net    was split almost evenly, with approximately half of 
the subjects positive and half negative). 
This highlights a potential problem with this model. It might be difficult to understand 
what kind of system the network is coming up with to map symbols to features. For future 
studies, it should be noted that the network design here did not randomize visual positions of 
objects as was done in the human experiment. This detail could turn out to explain why 
compositionality was so low for the networks. In theory, the responder network may have been 
able to learn to perform well by “drowning out” the visual input, because all that the task 
required was for the focus units of the responder to match those of the producer. If this 
happened, then messages from producer to responder might be uncorrelated with features in the 
environment in the systematic way that was expected. This could be addressed in future research. 
Another drawback of this particular model is that, despite its recurrent properties, the 
entire system may have a fixed point attractor. This means that once an optimal solution is found, 
there will be no further change of organization in the system, which may be at odds with our 
notion of what metonymy is. Alternative architectures with more varied dynamics may need to 
be explored to address this concern. 
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